FEBIOIDS UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THE LAHAINA-MAUI CORPORATION, a California corporation,

. Appellant,

No. 20419

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JOSEPH TAU TET HEW and HELEN AKIONA HEW, husband and wife, GEORGE TAN and SHIZUKO RUTH TAN, husband and wife,

Appellees.

FILED

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FRANK H. SCHMID, CLERK

BRIEF FOR THE LAHAINA-MAUI CORPORATION, APPELLANT

Appeal from Summary Judgment granted by the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii

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
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
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


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. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

THE LAHAINA-MAUI CORPORATION, a California corporation,

Appellant,

 \mathbbm{V} .

JOSEPH TAU TET HEW and HELEN AKIONA HEW, husband and wife, GEORGE TAN and SHIZUKO RUTH TAN, husband and wife,

Appellees.

No. 20419 Appeal from Summery Judgment granted by the United State District Court for the District of Hawaii

BRIEF FOR THE LAHAINA-MAUI CORPORATION, APPELLANT

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Plaintiffs-Appellees are citizens of Hawaii.


Defendant-Appellant corporation was organized and exists under

the laws of the State of California and has its principal

place of business in California (R.41-2).

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This is a controversy of which the United States District Courts have original jurisdiction in that the controversy is wholly between citizens of different States and the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds



\$10,000.0C, pursuant to Section 1332 of the Judicial Code, 28 USCA 1335.

The U. S. District Court for the State of Hawaii after granting a Petition for Removal (R.41-2) pursuant to Section 1441 of the Judicial Code, 28 USCA 1441, entered Summary Judgment granting relief prayed for by the Plaintiffs-Appellees and denying relief prayed for by Defendent-Appellant.

Notice of Appeal from that Judgment to this Honorable Court was filed on the 30th day of June 1965 (R 123).


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STATEMENT OF FACTS

On or about February 15, 1963, Appellant's predecessors in interest completed negotiations with Plaintie -Appellees for the lease from Appellees of certain unimproved land in the town of Lahaina, Island and County of Maui, State of Hawaii. On February 15, 1963, an option to lease such property was executed by Appellees and delivered to Defendent -Appellant's predecessors in interest in return for a consideration of \$1,000.00 paid by Defendant's predecessors in interest. The option and an extension thereof are Exhibits A and B respectively to Plaintiffs' complaint (Record pp 3-12). On July 26, 1963, the option was assigned to Appellant and on this same date Appellant and its predecessors in interest unconditionally exercised the option by signing and delivering to Appellees a "Notice of Exercise of Option to Lease" (Record p 102). On August 23, 1963, Appellees formally declined to execute a lease. On August 29, 1963, they filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit, State of Hawaii alleging that the option to lease constituted a cloud upon their title and asking for cancellation of the said option. On September 11, 1963, Appellant removed the cause to the

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United States District Court for the District of Haw ii and filed an answer denying the allegations of Plaintiffs. Defendants also filed a counterclaim proying that Appellees be required to specifically perform their obligations under the contract to lease and for damages in addition; the said counterclaim also proved for damages in the event a decree of specific performance was not granted.


The option executed by Appellees contained the names of the parties, a description of the premises, the term of the lease and of the option and the rental to be paid. Other matters to be included in the lease were disposed of by the following provision:

> Said lease shall contain the standard provisions normally contained in a lease for similar property situate in the State of Hawaii together with the provision that the Lessor shall subordinate their fee to permit the Lessee to obtain financing which provision is by way of example, but not by way of limitation.

On January 5, 1965, Plaintiffs-Appellees filed a "Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment" (Record pp 99-101) essentially on the

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
ground that the above provision was vague and indefinite and thus not specifically enforceable. After hearing on the motion the court below ruled orally on January 7, 1965, that in all respects save one the option to lease was governed by <u>Francone v. McClay</u>, 41 Haw. 72 (1955) and was thus specifically enforceable (Record pp 104-109). The offending provision, according to the court, was the latter portion of the clause quoted above; i.e.:

> . . . together with the provision that the Lesser shall subordinate their fee to permit the Lesse to obtain financing

The court found this provision uncertain notwithstanding defendant's offer in open court to provide empert testimony to the effect that it was clear and complete and that a subordination clause could be drawn from it without further negotiation or clarification (Record 112, 113).

Appellant, however, offered in open court to white all benefit under the offending provision in order to obtain a decree of specific performance and judgment was withhold pending submission of briefs and oral argument by the particle on the effect of this waiver. On June 14, 1965, the court below granted Appellees' motion for summary judgment (Record


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p 114-118) finding essentially that the clause quoted above was "so vague, indefinite and uncertain" that the entire option could not be specifically enforced. As to Appellent's waiver of the provision, it was held ineffective on the ground that the subordination clause was for the benefit of both parties, not the Appellant alone. No mention was made in the court's ruling of Appellant's prayer for damages in the event specific performance was not to be granted. The court also, in its order, cancelled the lis pendens previously recorded by Appellant in the Bureau of Conveyances of the State of Hawaii (Record p 119-121).

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SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS


1) The court could not properly find on a motion for summary judgment that the subordination clause was too indefinite for specific performance, particularly in light of Appellant's offer in open court to provide testimony and evidence to the contrary.

2) In any case, the court erred in finding as a matter of law that the subordination clause pertinent to this case was so indefinite as to render the option incapable of specific performance.

3) Even assuming the court properly found the subordination clause to be unenforceable, the court should have refused to grant summary judgment since the proper remedy in such case would be to grant specific performance conditioned upon Appellant foregoing the benefits it was to receive under the unenforceable clause.

4) Even assuming the court would not be required to grant the remedy described above, the court committed error in refusing to accept Appellant's waiver of the benefits accruing to it in the subordination clause thereby rendering the option specifically enforceable.

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5) Even assuming results unfavorable to Appellant in all the above specifications, the court committed error in granting Summary Judgment since even if the contract between Appellees and Appellant was too indefinite for specific performance, it could still be the object of a damage action.

6) The court erred as a matter of law in cancelling Appellant's lis pendens.


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SUPPLARY OF ARCING

The District Court erred in . Line the manual and tion clause was indefinite and not capa'le semplifie and not capa'le semplifie and not capa'le semplifie and semplifie and semplifie and semplifie and semplifie and semplifie and semplifies and semplif cont because the clause, on its face, i close, complete and definite. Even if the court had doubte as the finite it should not have granted a summary judgent, but stand a summary have heard the expert witnesses proffered by as a last, the last of which in a case of this kind is accepted procedure unc Maraii law. In any event, the court should have accupied appellant's offer to waive the benefits to which it is the it inder the subordination clause and should have reled the aiver cured the contract of any indefiniteness and the output bar to specific enforceability. Such vaiver is a common procedure there it is not possible to enforce a part of the performance quired of the other party and the waiving party is filling to the the benefit of such performance in order to obtain specific set formance of the remainder.

But even if the court were correct in rolling were still that specific enforcement of the contract could not be granted, it failed to understand that a substantially lesser degree of definiteness is required of contracts which are the subject of the action for damages than is required by equity for specific enforcement. The contract in this case quite clearly will sustain

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an action for damages, yet the court granted summery judges to to appellees even over appellant's claim for damages in loss of specific performance if the latter ware not granted.

Finally, the court erred in cancelling appellant' lis pendens since it did so without a shred of coidence given it justification for such an action and since such an action was beyond the court's power.

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
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APGU.CNT

I. The Subordination Clause:


Subordination agreements most frequently rise in the context of a purchase of unimproved real property when part of the payment is deferred and secured by a purchase money more and. This mortgage will have priority over any subsequent mortgage taken out by the purchaser, but, in many transactions, the purchaser obtains the seller's consent -- usually as pite of the terms of sale -- to permit such a subsequent mort and assume priority. There the transaction involves a lease refer than a purchase, the agreement to subordinate is and by the Lessor who agrees to permit the Lessee to subject his fer advala interest to a mortgage. The latter situation involves, in elect, the grant to the Lessee of a special interest in the fee -- an interest permitting the Lessee to encumber the fee, but notice ore. Mhether as part of a lease or of a sale, the sole purpose and function of a subordination agreement is to assign the Lessee or purchaser in obtaining financing; such agree ents constitute a common and important device in the financing of inprovements to realty in many areas of the country.

As may be seen, an unrestricted agreement by a leaser to subordinate his fee simple interest to a mortgage presented a



potential hazard for the Lessor in this respect: there the Lessee would normally have had to invest a certain portion his own funds to finance improvements, he list now be utilize the value of the fee simple interest for borro purposes, thus reducing or even eliminating the need for bia own funds. In such a case, the encumbrance upon the improvecents might approximate or equal their value, thus reducing the Lessor's "insurance" -- or security -- in the event of a brunch of the lease necessitating its cancellation and the taking over of the improvements by Lessee. The same hazard exists, of course, to a seller. Notwithstanding the risk, many subordination class are drawn, like the one in this case, without restrictions of any kind upon the mortgage to which subordination will be allowi. Others contain restrictions for the protection of the seller or Lessor, often limiting the use of funds borrowed under such mortgages to financing improvements and/or restricting the amount of the mortgage to a specified percentage of the value of the improvements.


- 1/ See, Applefield v. Fidelity Federal Savin's and Loun Second tion of Tampa, 137 S. 2d.259 (Ct. App. Fla. 1962)
- 2/ See, <u>e.g.</u>, <u>York Mortgage Co. v. Clotar Construction Corp.</u>, 254 N.Y. 128, 172 N.E. 265 (1930); <u>Lorder v. Perlaar</u>, 129 pp. Div. 93, 113 N.Y. Supp. 420 (1908).
- 3/ See, e.g. Darst v. Bates, 95 Ill. 493 (1880). See also, Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Fairfield Gardens, 260 N.Y. 16, 132 N.E. 231 (1932) (Subordination limited to a particular mortage).



Essentially, Plaintiffs' claim respecting the alleged indefiniteness of the subordination clause is that it is incomplete because no restrictions were set forth in the option. The inswer to this claim is obvious: there are no restrictions. The phrase, "Lessor shall subordinate their fee to permit the Lessee to obtain financing" may lack something grammatically but it is as clear, definite and unequivocal as a phrase can be. It is a simple matter to prepare a clause for insertion in a lease reflecting the agreement of the parties as shown by this provision with no possibility of misunderstanding or distortion of the stated intent. Indeed, the Defendant stated in open court on two occasions that it would provide experts to testify at the trial of this matter that the clause had a definite and ascertainable meaning as it stood. (pp 112, 113) In Francone v. McClay, 41 Haw. 72 (1955), the Supreme Court of Hawaii affirmed


4/ If Plaintiffs' contention is that restrictions were intended but were somehow left out of the written agreement, the Plaintffs are raising a question of fact which is disputed by the answer and which is, therefore, incapable of adjudication by a Summary Judgment. Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c).

5/ It might have been possible to manufacture a claim of ambiguity on the ground that there was no specification of what the "financing" was to be used for. Defendant, however, admits and has never denied that this word was intended to, and does, refer to the financing of improvements on the subject property.




decree of specific performance of a contract to lease almost recisely like ours as against a claim that it was indefinite. he testimony of Mr. Howard Moore, "a member of the Bar and an xpert in realty transactions," was accepted by the trial court nd apparently relied upon by the Supreme Court in holding that s to long term leases, a contract containing a provision that he lease shall contain "all other usual covenants" was ufficiently definite to be specifically enforceable. Appellant ffered the testimony of the same expert to the same effect as is testimony in that case; i.e., that the challenged subrdination clause is sufficiently clear and definite to be ranslated into a formal and complete lease clause without any urther information being necessary. (Record pp. 112, 113). he Francone case establishes that, under Hawaii law (which overns this case), the definiteness and thus enforceability f lease provisions is a question of fact, or at least a uestion upon which the testimony of experts in the community is elevant. The court below thus should not have granted a ummary judgment on the question, particularly when the only roffered testimony was directly contrary to the court's ruling.

The District Court ruled here, in essence, that an greement to subordinate is not complete unless there are retrictions upon same and unless they are spelled out. In short, n owner of property cannot enter into an agreement to subordinate




less he also negotiates and obtains conditions upon such agreent which are protective to him and restrictive upon the other rty. The absurdity of such a rule becomes apparent when a bordination agreement is viewed in its proper perspective th other security devices. In most states, and in Hawaii, a ller of land taking less than the full purchase price in cash uld receive a promissory note for which the purchaser was rsonally liable⁶ as well as the added security of a mortgage the property. It is clear that a seller of land in such a ate could, if he wished, omit the mortgage entirely and accept promissory note for the unpaid balance of the purchase price, ereby relying directly on the seller's personal credit witht any further security; equally the seller could insist on curity in the form of a mortgage on the land and of all future provements, as well as all other real and personal belongings the buyer. In short, the seller could accept anything in a nge from no security at all to an almost infinite amount of curity. Whether he wants security at all and, if so, how much, e clearly matters left to be decided between him and his purchaser the absence of fraud the courts never have been

Wodehouse v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 32 Haw. 835 (1933)




willing to interfere.⁷ There is no difference except in decree between, 1) a seller relying solely on the purchaser's personal credit and having no mortgage at all as security, 2) a tabler having as security a purchase money mortgage which he has a greed to subordinate to whatever other mortgage the purchaser may pince on the property, 3) a seller having as security a purchase more mortgage which he is willing to subordinate only within prescribed limitations, and 4) a seller having a purchase money mortgage which he is not willing to subordinate at all.

- 7/ CF Brown v. Carter, 15 Haw. 333 (1903); <u>Lumenk v. Med.</u>, Haw. 591 (1862) (.hether it was a wise and julicious contract is not for the court to say."); <u>Modebouse</u> op. cit. It 843 ("courts of equity do not thus come to the assistance of persons of legal age and of sound mind in a transaction free from mistake and fraud who have merely committed an error of judgment").
- 2/ In California, however, an entirely different situation prevails, for by statute the purchaser of property here personal liability under a purchase money ortage. <u>Lett-fornia Civil Procedure Code</u> §580(b). This may help entire the existence of a couple of cases from the internelise appellate courts of that state holding that an unrestricted agreement to subordinate by sellers taking purchase mortgages is unenforceable. <u>Yessler v. Supp.</u> 169 C1., 2d. 818, 338 P2d. 34 (1959); <u>Wright v. Tred Levies Internelise</u>, 6 Cal. Rptr. 392 (Ct. App. 1959). Neither of these gives any reasoning or explanation of its action; both heavily on equally unreasoned obiter dictum in <u>Gould 1</u>. 127 Cal. App. 2d.1, 273 P.2d. 93 (1954) which they incorrection refer to as the "holding" of that case.



The one case which Appellant has been able to find from a comparabl jurisdiction which is squarely in point is <u>McCarty v. Harris</u>, 113 So. 233 (Ala. 1927); specific performance was granted.

The District court erred in its decision to the effect that the subordination clause is incapable of specific performance because it refused to accept the testimony of experts as required by Hawaii law. In any event, its decision produces a rule wholly out of keeping with Hawaii jurisprudence-and, indeed, anomalous in the jurisprudence of the common law. The court should be reversed.




II. Waiver

Even if it should be found that the subordination clause this case cannot be specifically enforced the court below ould not have granted summary judgment. The proper remedy such a case is to grant defendant specific performance condioned upon defendant's waiving its right to benefits under the bordination clause. 9/ In this case, of course, it was not cessary for the court to decree specific performance in a contional form for defendant offered in open court to waive its nefits under the subordination clause. The law is settled and ite clear that an indefinate provision or provisions in a conact otherwise suitable for specific enforcement may be waived the party entitled to the benefit thereunder and that that rty then becomes entitled to the specific enforcement of the lance of the contract. Some examples from the writers and eatises:

Restatement, Contracts §365

The fact that a part of the promised performance cannot be rendered, or is otherwise such that its specific enforcement would violate some of the rules stated in §§360-380 does not prevent the specific enforcement of the remainder, if in all other respects the requisites for specific performance of that remainder exist.... (among the rules in §§360-380 is that in §370 forbidding specific enforcement of terms which are undertain).

E.g., Hubbell v. Ward, 40 Wash. 2d 779, 246 P 2d 468 (1952)



49 Am. Jur. Specific Performance, §77

Where the plaintiff is willing to perform all of his obligations under a contract, he may waive the failure of the defendant to perform portions of the contract, and obtain specific performance of the balance of the contract, provided the case is otherwise an appropriate one for such a decree.

Pomeroy's Specific Performance of Contracts §161 (3rd Ed. 1926)

If an agreement consists of two parts which are separable, so that one portion could be enforced by itself, it would be no objection to a specific execution of one such part that the other is too uncertain to admit of the same remedy.

Fry on Specific Performance of Contracts §361 (note 1, p. 175)

It will be no objection to decreeing specific performance of a part of a contract, that another part is uncertain. (See also <u>id</u>. at §§355, 966.)

There is a very large body of case law decreeing partial r conditional specific performance of contracts such as ours. erhaps the situation which arises most frequently is that in hich a vendor or lessor owns some interest but does not have s good title as he agreed to convey. In all such cases the courts ave granted specific performance at the insistence of the vendee r lessee, requiring conveyance of all the vendor has even though he flaw in his title may be such that he could not himself have btained specific performance.

0/ 4 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence §1405b (5th Ed. 1941)

r example, in Lee Wah Koon v. Maui Dry Goods and Grocery Company, d., 30 Haw. 313 (1928), the defendant was lessee of some 14 res of land which it had subleased to one Takemori. Defendant tered into an agreement with plaintiff whereby it was to assign plaintiff all its right, title and interest in the leased land well as the title and interest of Takemori. At the time for rformance Takemori was unwilling to release his interest and e defendant was unable to induce him to do so. Plaintiff ought an action for specific performance. Held: Defendant st convey all the interest which it owns and must pay compention to the plaintiff, by way of reduction in the purchase, the value of Takemori's interest. (In this case the compention ammounted to almost the entire purchase price.) $\frac{11}{1}$ These ses make it clear that if appellees were unable to perform their reement to make their fee simple interest available to the lessee r mortgage purposes because they did not own the fee simple, ssee could waive that defect and obtain specific performance the remainder of the agreement. There should be no difference outcome where the owners are able to perform, but need not do because of a lack of the requisite definiteness in the agreent.

For examples of this situation outside this jurisdiction, see e.g., <u>Torelle v. Templeman</u>, 94 Mont. 149, 21 P.2d 60 (1933); <u>Eppstein v. Cuhn</u>, 225 Ill. 115, 80 N.E. 80.(1906); <u>Levine v. LaFayette Building Corp</u>., 103 N.J.Eq. 121, 142 Atl. 441 (1928); 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 117; Case Note, 23 Mich. L.R. 535 (1925).

In any event, there is an almost equally large body of se law decreeing partial or conditional specific enforcement contracts in which one or more terms cannot be specifically corced because indefinite. These cases are entirely undistin-


A provision which frequently seems to be indefinite is it providing for deferred payment of all or a part of the puruse price in options or contracts. Often such terms as rate interest, period of deferment, form or terms of security and an amount to be deferred are left unstated or are specifically t for future agreement. These provisions are not specifically orceable at the behest of the optionee or buyer, but the irts enforce the options or contracts subject to waiver by the ionee or buyer of the right to defer. For example: In Inton v. Williams, 209 Ga. 16, 70 S.E.2d 461 (1952), the parties ered into an agreement for the purchase of land with a house to built thereon. The payment terms recited in the agreement were at the total purchase price was to be \$10,000, of which \$4,000 to be paid in cash with the balance to be obtained by purchaser obtaining a "G.I. Loan". If he could not obtain such a loan, e seller was himself to loan the balance to the purchaser. No te of maturity, interest rate, or amount of monthly payments s stated. The purchaser was unable to obtain a G.I. Loan. The ller's defense to a bill for specific performance was based in rt upon the indefiniteness of the loan provisions. The court

: "But the offer of the purchaser to pay cash is a waiver of provision which is for his benefit, and he has a right to a it. This waiver eliminates that portion of the contract ting to the loan, including the indefiniteness". There was apparently an indefiniteness concerning the specifications construction of the house and this indefiniteness was also ed upon by the seller. Again the court held that the buyers' ingness to accept the house as it was waived all indefiniteness.

In <u>Hubbell v. Ward</u>, 40 Wash2d 779, 246 P.2d 468 (1952), ntiff and defendant executed an earnest money receipt and ement for the purchase of an apartment house. Plaintiff was ay \$9,000 upon evidence of merchantable title and to "sign ntract for the balance, payable at \$200.00 or more per month, uding interest at the rate of 5% on deferred balances". The t found this provision too indefinite for specific enforcebecause there was no "standard" contract in that state to a the parties could have had reference. The court granted a see of partial specific performance, however, conditional plaintiff's tendering "payment of the balance of the full tact price of \$29,000 within a reasonable time".

In <u>Trotter v. Lewis</u>, 185 Md. 528, 45 A2d 329 (1946), e was an option in a lease of land whereby the lessee could hase it at a "price not to exceed \$2,500, with interest not xceed 6% per annum". <u>Held</u>: Specific performance will be

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granted conditioned upon the purchaser tendering the full 52,500 in cash. $\frac{12}{}$


Of course, the principle of partial or conditional specific performance is not limited to indefinite provisions for deferred payment, any more than it is limited to eases involving insufficient title. As the <u>Blanton</u> case (<u>aupra</u>) shows, it applies to any indefinite provision in a contract, provided, as always, that the provision is for the benefit of the party speking specific performance. The following cases provide examples of application to a variety of indefinite provisions.

In Prilik v. Goodman, 111 N.Y.S. 2d 916 (S.Ct. 195_) plaintiff entered into a contract with defendant to purchase his irug store business; part of the contract was that defendant was to give plaintiff a five year lease on the premises upon which the lrug store stood at a rental of \$100 per month with an option to extend the lease for an additional 5 years at \$110 per month. No etails of the lease were included in the agreement. Plaint prought an action for specific performance. In a motion to lismiss brought by the defendant on the grounds of indefiniteness, the court denied the motion and said: "The main relief south herein is the specific performance of the agreement by defendant to sell plaintiff a drug store business. If, after trial, it develops that the court cannot grant specific performance of that part of the agreement to 'deliver' a lease to plaintie,

12/
See also Morris v. Bellard, 56 App. D.C. 3.3, 16 F. 2d 175 (1926)

Levine v. LaFavette Blog. Corp., 103 N.J.Eq 121, 142 .tl. 41

(1928); Haire v. Patterson, 386 P2d 953 (Vash. 1963)
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


ratter may elect to accept and the court may decree part cific performance to the extent of the vendor's ability to ply with the other terms of the agreement". (Id. at 918)

In Jasper v. Wilson, 14 N.Mex. 482, 94 Pac. 951 (1908), vendee entered into an agreement with the agent of the owner the property whereby the vendee was to purchase it and obtain arranty deed. The owner defended on the ground that the nt had no authority to grant a warranty deed. The vendee willing to accept title without warranties. The court said: is a well recognized principle of equity that a vendee, in action brought by him for specific performance of a contract. waive the performance on the part of the vendor of portions nis contract, and may elect to take a partial performance ne himself is willing to perform". Here, although the agent have exceeded his powers, the plaintiff waived such excess was entitled to a decree of specific performance. $\frac{13}{}$

The authorities have been laid out in what was, perhaps, essive detail. Nevertheless, they establish beyond doubt that cific performance conditioned upon waiver of an unenforceable vision is neither a novel nor an unusual procedure. Rather, is a standard equitable remedy utilized throughout the common jurisdictions. They further establish that ours is a classic

See also Wright v. Houdaille Hershey Corp., 321 Mich. 21, 31 N.W.2d 85 (1948); Neely v. Broadstreet National Bank of Redbank, 16 FSupp. 839 (D.N.J. 1936).



ase for application of the remedy. We have a contract, valid, inding and fully enforceable in all its terms save one; that one s for the benefit only of the party seeking the court's aid. nis is the same situation which prevailed in virtually every one the cases cited and discussed above; they are indistinguishable om this case and compel a conclusion that the plaintiff's motion or summary judgment should be denied. The District court ruled, wever, that the very existence of the subordination clause withthe option rendered the entire option tainted forever insofar specific enforceability is concerned. Nor could waiver by the fendant of its benefits under the subordination clause render e balance of the contract specifically enforceable, notwithstandg that the balance was definite and appropriate for specific forcement. (Record pp. 105-06). In the court's own words:

When one reads the entire paragraph in the "Option to Lease", <u>supra</u>, pertinent here, it does not appear with any certainty whatsoever that the subordination of the fee clause was intended and understood by the parties to be solely for the benefit of the lessee. The subordination clause was tightly entwined with "the standard provisions normally contained in" a Hawaiian lease and was clearly tied into the above "provisions" by the words which followed


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the subordination clause, viz., "which provision (for subordination) is by way of example, but not by way of limitation."

That the subordination clause was so delineated, unequivocally indicates that it was intended to be an integral and highly essential provision of the lease -- as this court has previously ruled -- and manifestly thus was intended to be for the benefit of both parties -- not the vendee alone. The term of the lease was to be 56 1/2 years. If a building of x value were placed thereon, it might be completely depreciated by the time the lease expired, whereas if a building of y value were built thereon, it might still be of great value to the lessor at the termination of the lease. The difference between an x or y building might well be the difference between subordination and no subordination of the fee, and in that difference the plaintiff had an obvious interest and potential benefit.


Unless it can be said with certainty that the option, on its face, shows the subordination clause was intended solely to benefit the lessee, then an attempted unilateral waiver by the lessee of that



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
Unless it can be said with certainty that the option, on its face, shows the subordination clause was intended solely to benefit the lessee, then an attempted unilateral waiver by the lessee of that



mutual benefit of both parties is deficient. A mutual right cannot be waived unilaterally. (Cite omitted) (Record pp. 117-118). $\frac{14}{}$


Somehow the court became confused between the apparent ortance of the clause as indicated by its location in the agreeand the question whose benefit it was for. There is no reton between the two. $\frac{15}{}$ This confusion is unfortunate for it clear, both from the language of the option and from the nae of subordination, that the clause provides no benefit whatto the owners. The language of the provision -- "The Lessor I subordinate their fee to permit the Lessee to obtain financing" claces a duty only upon the Lessor; the Lessee is required to nothing. There is no obligation, implied or otherwise, the Lessee to utilize the funds obtained because

In the almost 75 pages of briefs and memoranda filed and the extensive oral argument presented in the District Court preceding this ruling, only an occasional passing reference was made to the claim that the subordination clause was for the benefit of appellees. Their attorney made no serious attempt to argue or present this theory and it was not mentioned by the court prior to issuance of the ruling quoted above. For example, one can imagine a provision bargained for and obtained by the Lessee permitting him to cancel the lease on 30 days notice. Such a provision might be of the utmost importance insofar as the Lessee is concerned, but the fact that it is important does not in any way make it beneficial to the Lessor. The same is true, of course, of many other more common provisions such as an option to extend the lease or to purchase the fee simple title at a given price or a provision calling for the rent to go up (or down) to a certain figure at a given time.



ich it must repay) investing the same uneconomically and unfitably in prolonging the life of the improvements beyond the e when they will benefit him. Surely, this kind of possible --unlikely, indirect, potential advantage does not transform subordination clause into something designed for the benefit the Lessor. $\frac{16}{1}$ In many of the cases previously cited, the ties had stipulated that payment of a purchase price was to be e over a period of time at a given rate of interest. $\frac{17}{1}$ It is more plausible that the sellers in those cases would have reved some benefit from deferred payment (either because of their situation or because the interest to be received was more than y could earn otherwise) than that the Lessors in this case will r receive any benefit from subordination. Yet, in each of those es, the court permitted specific performance on the basis of buyer's willingness to pay all cash. These cases thus estaba that the right to waive is not limited to provisions which ld never, under any stretch of the imagination, be beneficial the other party; rather waiver is proper of provisions where direct, bargained-for benefit accrues to the waiving party.

Indeed, one wonders why, if the clause is beneficial to these Lessors, they have refused to perform under it. E.g., <u>Blanton vs. Williams</u>, 209 Ga.16, 70 S.E.2d 461 (1952); <u>Hubbell v. Ward</u>, 40 Wash.2d 779, 246 P.2d 468 (1952); and <u>Trotter v. Lewis</u>, 185 Md. 528, 45A.2d 329 (1946).




The rationale underlying all the waiver cases previously ed is not only the general policy of the common law that contracts ht to be enforced where possible in order to effectuate the intions of the parties; $\frac{18}{}$ There is also a strong feeling that is unfair to permit a party to a contract who has avoided one his obligations thereunder because of some defect to assert own avoidance as an excuse for avoiding the balance of his igations as well. $\frac{19}{}$ To permit this would be to permit a iberate avoidance of the general policy in favor of contract prcement, and it would constitute a turning away by courts of ity from their traditional reliance upon substance and actual ent toward a mechanical jurisprudence based upon technicality form. $\frac{20}{}$ For these reasons, it has not been permitted. $\frac{21}{}$

The appellees are in a somewhat awkward position in this e for they first assert their unwillingness to perform a given y under the lease and, then, must convince the court that this

See eg, 17 Am. Jur. 2d, <u>Contracts §§75</u>, 244, 254. <u>F.S. Royster</u>. <u>Guano Co. v. Hall</u>, 68 Fed. 2d 533 (C.A.4 1934). <u>See Morris v. Ballard</u>, 56 App.D.C. 383, 16 Fed. 175 (1926); <u>Pomeroy's Specific Performance of Contracts</u> (3d Ed. 1926) Sec. 155; <u>Fry on Specific Performance of Contracts</u> (3d Ed. 1884) Sec. 830. <u>4 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence</u> §378 (5th Ed. 1941).

See note 19, supra; discussion of waiver cases, passim.



was really for their benefit. If appellees wish, the appelwill be happy to alter its offer to waive the subordination sion by offering to waive only so much thereof as appellees e; the appellees may then subordinate their fee simple inters much as they wish.

The District Court was in error in refusing to accept lant's offer to waive its benefits under the subordination e and should be reversed on this ground.



Appellant's Claim for Damages in Lieu of Specific Performance:


Even if specific performance is not an appropriate remedy is case, the District Court erred in granting summary judgment ppellees since appellant was still entitled to an award of es. The law is clear that a finding of indefiniteness or uneteness sufficient to render a contract incapable of specific rmance, is not also a finding that the complaining party canbtain damages for the breach thereof. For example, Pomery

greater certainty is required in the terms of an agreement which is to be specifically executed in equity than is necessary in a contract which is to be the basis of an action at law for damages. An action at law is founded upon the mere non-performance of the defendant and this negative conclusion can often be established without determining all the terms of the agreement with exactness.

Pomerey's Specific Performance of Contracts,

(3d Ed. 1884) Sec. 361.

even though an agreement may be too indefinite in its terms pecific enforcement, it may be certain enough to constitute



lid contract for breach of which damages may be recovered.


The requirements of definiteness which must be met by a ract in order to maintain an action for damages for the sh thereof are stated in 17 Am. Jur., <u>Contracts</u>, §§75-85. are that it must be sufficiently definite in its essential as as to time for performance, subject matter and quantity and a or consideration to allow a court to determine whether its a have been breached. In this case a clear and definite ofto lease designated property for a definite period at a set a was made by the appellees and unequivocally accepted by lant.

Only one term has been deemed indefinite, and that term ntirely unnecessary to a determination of whether there has performance by the appellee or to a determination of the nt of damages suffered by appellant. To some extent it t be argued that the clause would at least be helpful in mining the amount of damages, since appellant's lease would been more valuable with an unrestricted subordination agreein it than without, and its damages would therefore have greater. Appellant, however, will waive performance under subordination clause by appellee and thus eliminate any poslity of difficulty with respect to damage computation. $\frac{22}{}$

17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §390



If the District Court found that the contract in this case too indefinite to sustain a damage action, it was clearly more. Appellant in its counterclaim alleged all necessary ents to an action in damages which raised substantial issues act between the parties, and the summary judgment was, thereimproperly granted.




ne.

IV. Lis Pendens:

In its final order, the District Court erroneously ancelled the lis pendens recorded by the appellant in the Bureau f Conveyances in the State of Hawaii on October 25, 1963. The iling of lis pendens in Hawaii is governed by statute, the pplicable provision of which is as follows: "In any action, hether at law or in equity, affecting the title or the right f possession of real property, the plaintiff, complainant or etitioner at the time of filing the complaint or petition or ill in equity, and the defendant or respondent, at the time of iling his answer, when affirmative relief is claimed in such nswer, shall record in the Bureau of Conveyances a notice of the endency of the action, containing the names of the parties and he object of the action or defense, and a description of the roperty affected thereby. From and after the time of filing uch notice for record, a purchaser or incumbrancer of the property ffected shall be deemed to have constructive notice of the penency of such action, and of its pendency against parties desigated by their real names."23

Appellant, upon removal of this case to the Federal ourt and upon filing its answer hereunder, recorded a lis pendens erving notice of the pendency of this suit as authorized by staute. A lis pendens does not expire upon issuance of a judgment,

3/ Revised Laws of Hawaii (1955) Sec. 230-42




c only upon the final determination of the case, including e outcome of any appeals.²⁴ Appellant's right to record a s pendens and thereby obtain the protection granted it by the gislature of the State of Hawaii is unconditional. The effect the District Court's action is to deprive the Appellant of is right without any reason or justification therefor and thout any finding of fact or law to support its action. This error, if for no other reason than that a Federal Court must llow the substantive law of the State in diversity cases.²⁵ was also error because, as a matter of law, a court, absent atutory authorization, has no authority to cancel a lis pendens.²⁶

<u>E.g.</u>, <u>Wilkin v. Shell Oil Co.</u>, 197 F.2d 42 (1952); <u>Maedel v.</u> <u>Wies</u>, 15 N.W. 2d 692 (Mich. 1944); <u>Kremer v. Schutz</u>, 107 Pac. 780 (Kan. 1910).

Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 82 L. Ed. 188 (1938)

Moran v. Midland Farms Company, 282 S.W. 608 (Tex. 1926); Marpret Corp. v. Hargust Corp., 210 N.Y.S. 465 (1925); Corpus Juris Secundum, Lis pendens Section 37.



CONCLUSION

For the reasons previously stated, the District Court red in its conclusion that the subordination clause was too adefinite for specific enforcement and further erred in its mclusion that Defendants offered to waive its benefits under at clause, was invalid and did not correct any indefiniteness at clause, was invalid and did not correct any indefiniteness at therein. This court should reverse the District ourt's grant of summary judgment to Appellees and remand, with astructions to set the matter for trial. In the alternative, his court should find that the District Court erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment as against Appellant's rayer for pecuniary damages.

In addition, this court should rule that the purorted cancellation of Defendant's lis pendens by the District ourt was error and should reverse the District Court in this espect.

I certify that, in connection with the preparation of his brief, I have examined Rules 18 and 19 of the United States ourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and that, in my opinion, he foregoing brief is in full compliance with those rules.

Richard P. Schulze Jr. Actorney for the Appellant

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIPCUIT

HE LAHAINA-MAUI CORPORATION,) California corporation,)		
Appellant,)	110.	20419
-vs-		
SEPH TAU TET HEW and HELEN		
KIONA HEW, husband and wife,) LORGE TAN and SHIZUKO RUTH TAN,)		
usband and wife,)		

Appellees.

CIRTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 9th day of November, 1965, caused to be mailed (First Class Mail) in the U.S. Post ffice at Honolulu, Hawaii, postage thereon fully prepaid, mree copies of the foregoing brief of the above named Appellion, Æ LAHAINA-MAUI CORPORATION, addressed to Nr. William M. Swope, mith, Wild, Beebe & Cades, First National Bank Building, pnolulu, Hawaii.

DATED at Honolulu, Hawaii this 9th day of November, 965.

SCI.U TRD P. RI

